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The punitive transition in youth justice: Reconstructing the child 
as offender over time in England and Wales 




The transition from ‘child’ to ‘offender’ status can be fast‐tracked when offending is formally 
recognised through formal disposal, with children treated increasing punitively as they progress 
through the Youth Justice System. The status and ‘offenderising’ transitions of children who 
offend is socio‐historically contingent, not only on their behaviour, but on political, socio‐
economic, societal, systemic and demography. We support this perspective through a 
periodised re‐examination of four socio‐historical trajectories in the construction of the ‘youth 
offender’: Conflict, ambivalence and bifurcation (1908‐1979); depenalising diversion and back 
to justice (1980‐1992), fast‐tracking the child to offender transition (1993‐2007) and tentative 
depenalisation (2008 to present). 
 
Introduction 
The ‘punitive turn’ of the 1990s served to highlight an alarming dynamic in youth justice in 
England and Wales. Children who offended were increasingly deemed to have forfeited their 
childhood status and its associated rights and safeguards, despite offending often acting as a 
transitory stopping off point on their life course trajectory into adulthood and ‘only one element 
in a much wider and more complex identity’ (Drakeford 2009: 8). Children1 experiencing 
problems and demonstrating needs in other domains of their life are typically understood as 
innocent, vulnerable ‘beings’ requiring care, protection and support from more resourceful and 
powerful adult stakeholders. The safeguarding, welfare and well-being of these children ‘in 
need’ is prioritised and their ‘child’ status is held paramount in determining how they are 
understood and responded to. However, when children with equivalent problems and needs 
(often the same children) offend, punitive and neo-correctionalist ‘offenderising’ approaches 
tend to predominate, usurping the needs-led, ‘children first’ rationales of other support systems 
for children.  
 
1 We employ the terms ‘child’ and 'children’ throughout, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (United Nations,1989) definition of a child as anyone up to the age of 18 and to counterpose 




This article argues that the potential for this transition from child to offender (hereafter termed 
the ‘offenderisation’ of the child) has its roots in the  conflict and ambivalence regarding the 
appropriate treatment of children embedded in the creation of the Youth Justice System as it 
emerged in the early part of the twentieth century. Locating our argument firmly within the 
context of England and Wales with which we are most familiar, we assert that the 
reconstruction of children as offenders has been evident in each of the various configurations 
through which that system has passed in the subsequent 100 or so years but has taken various 
forms. In particular, some manifestations of youth justice have encouraged a more rapid 
transition in the construction of children from innocent to culpable, from vulnerable individuals 
requiring protection to responsible quasi-adults deserving of punishment; while others have 
served to slow that trajectory. The periodisation of the development of youth justice in England 
and Wales is not new; it has been undertaken expertly by others (e.g. Smith 2013; Muncie 
2015; Hopkins-Burke 2016; Godfrey et al 2018; Case 2018). Similarly, the identification of a 
cyclical nature to the treatment of children in trouble is an insight made cogently elsewhere, 
notably through Goldson’s (2015) notion of ‘circular motions’ in the trajectory of youth justice.  
Therefore, the original and unique contribution here, we argue, lies in our use of periodisation 
to enable a focus on how children become offenders (i.e. the ‘offenderisation’ of the child) and 
the implications of offenderisation for the contemporary implementation of a ‘child first’ 
strategy of youth justice in England and Wales. We present an overview of shifts in the 
treatment of children in trouble, through an historical analysis that focuses on the nature of the 
child to offender transition at different junctures. We also offer some tentative remarks on the 
implications for the development of a ‘child first’ mode of youth justice, to which the Youth 
Justice Board in England and Wales has recently committed (Youth Justice Board, 2018).  
 
Understanding offenderisation: The child to offender transition 
The argument that children lose their socially-prescribed innocence and access to their 
allegedly universal unconditional rights (United Nations,1989) once they have offended is 
well-rehearsed (cf. Cunneen et al 2016; Haines and Case 2015). It is often justified with 
reference to disparities in ascribed responsibility at different ages in other walks of life: 
children as young as ten can be held fully responsibility for offending behaviour, yet are 
considered too irresponsible to be permitted other behaviours and activities  for instance 
purchasing  tobacco or alcohol,  consenting to sex, leaving school, getting married) until they 
are much older (cf. Bateman 2014). Such justifications are consolidated by rights-based 
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criticisms of children’s treatment in/by the Youth Justice System (YJS), such as the court-
ordered imposition of unpaid labour, restrictions of liberty, extreme measures of control and 
surveillance (see Goldson 2019) and, in particular, their inhumane treatment in custodial 
institutions (see Willow 2015). Our concern here is to trace the form which the transition from 
child to offender has taken and different historical junctures in order to better understand the 
complexity of influences on children’s trajectories through the YJS and the potential futures 
for ‘child first’ youth justice. It is generally understood that conflict and ambivalence, has 
characterised responses to children’s lawbreaking in England and Wales from the 
establishment of the youth justice system, a tension that is reflected in the perennial ‘welfare 
versus justice debate’ (Smith 2005) - a battle for paradigmatic supremacy between two 
conflicting ‘models’ that have shaped the systems, structures, strategies, philosophies and 
practices of youth justice (cf. Brett 2018). This narrative however tends to imply that responses 
to children in trouble are dichotomous: that welfarist practices acknowledge the child’s 
innocence because they focus on the similarities between children in trouble and those need of 
care and protection; while justice principles embody a loss of innocence because they are 
predicated on responsibility for the criminal behaviour, leading to a process of what has been 
called ‘adulteration’ (Fionda, 2001), in which children are increasingly conceptualised, and 
treated, as if they were significantly older.  
 
In our view, such a dichotomous account, while it undoubtedly has its merits as a typology, 
involves simplification of the full complexity and contingency of constructions of youth justice. 
In particular, concrete scrutiny of youth justice in England and Wales at various conjunctures 
does not support a necessary correlation between justice and a loss of innocence or, conversely, 
welfare and a commitment to it. Accordingly, we argue that in order to understand the processes 
whereby children who offend are regarded as less deserving than others who display 
problematic behaviours, a more nuanced analysis is required that pays attention to the 
underlying punitive (offenderising) dynamics and transitions, that persist between- and within-
periods with different philosophical underpinnings. While these dynamics may appear in 
amended or attenuated form at different times, they continue to determine how children who 
come into conflict with the law are conceptualised and to influence the pathways along which 





In order to frame and qualify the subsequent analysis, two further points are in order. First, the 
point at which ‘offender status’ is ascribed and supersedes the child’s previous status is not 
clear cut but, for current purposes, we have located it at as coinciding with the imposition of a 
formal youth justice sanction that gives rise to a criminal record, (.in England and Wales, this 
would include conviction at court, youth caution or conditional youth caution but not a 
‘community resolution’ or other informal outcomes).While identifying a shift in status with 
particular forms of disposals may involve an element of simplification – there may, of course, 
be degrees offenderisation – we consider that the imposition of a criminal record constitutes a 
significant threshold in terms of the potential for stigmatisation, labelling, diminished future 
opportunities and associated iatrogenic consequences. 
 
Second, it is important to acknowledge that the nature of the transition and the likelihood of it 
occurring is shaped by a range of contingencies that are present (or not) in the child’s life at 
the point of their offenderisation. Such contingencies include, inter alia: political (e.g. law-
making, legislation, and policy – see Muncie 2015);socio-economic (e.g. rapid change, 
austerity – see Case 2018); demographic (e.g. gender – see Goodfellow 2019; Sharpe in Case 
2018); ethnicity – (see May et al 2010; Lammy, 2017); care status – (see Dept. of Education 
2018; Bateman et al, 2018), dispositional (e.g. children’s deference, attitude, acceptance of 
social norms, willingness to comply with youth justice processes – see Hopkins-Burke 2016), 
professional (e.g. practice, academia, media – see Case 2018) and public/societal (e.g. 
opinions/attitudes, treatment of children – see Smith, 2013). These contingencies frequently 
play an important role in understanding what happens to the individual child, whilst their 
personal and social needs and circumstances can take a poor second place.  Nonetheless, 
restrictions of space, and in some cases a lack of historical data, preclude a detailed account of 
the influence of these contingencies on the offenderisation of children across the period covered 
in this paper.  
 
Evidencing the offenderising transition 
Employing a socio-historical approach to process analysis, we identify and apply a 
chronological framework to evidence the dynamic and often punitive, offenderising transitions 
that are experienced by children within the YJS of England and Wales. Such an approach 
enables lessons to be learnt from youth justice past so that we can better understand the present 
(and potential future) of youth justice, particularly by charting the emergence of (punitive) 
transitions and the contingencies that influence the child’s changing positions and experiences 
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within and between these transitions from ‘child’ to ‘offender’.  Our process-orientated analysis 
deploys historical data ‘to explain the genesis of contemporary behaviours, policies and 
institutions’, fusing sociological criminology’s ‘strong sense of contemporary purpose [with 
the] strong sense of time perception’ demonstrated by criminal justice historians (Lawrence 
2012: 317).  
 
The underpinning argument throughout is that the fluctuating position (and labelling) of 
children who offend has been and remains socio-historically contingent, not only on their 
behaviour, but on political, socio-economic, societal, systemic and demography. We generate 
evidence to support this perspective from a re-examination of the socio-historical trajectories 
of responses to children who offend. Four broadly-drawn periods in the socio-historical 
construction of the ‘youth offender’ are outlined which, taken together, explicate the origins 
and trajectories of the child to offender transition: conflict, ambivalence and bifurcation, 
depenalising diversion and back to justice, fast-tracking the child to offender transition, 
tentative depenalisation. 
 
1. Conflict, ambivalence and bifurcation (1908 – 1979)  
From the early 20th century onwards, a criminal justice system for children as distinct from 
adults began to emerge – a system characterised by conflict and ambivalence as to how children 
in trouble should be constructed and justifying responses that viewed them as simultaneously 
innocent and dangerous. Prior to this period, there was no legal, conceptual or practical 
distinction between the ‘adult’ and ‘the juvenile offender’. Consequently, the transition from 
child to offender was largely coterminous with the transition from child to adult. There was a 
clear binary divide between children below the age of criminal responsibility (then 7 years) 
and any person over that age who broke the law. However, during the 19th century, an increased 
identification of children as different from adults precipitated the discovery of ‘adolescence’ 
as a distinct developmental life stage (Hall 1908; see also Case 2018). This new social 
construction introduced the possibility of older children being understood as relatively innocent 
when they offended, by comparison to adults, because of a recognition of reduced culpability.   
 
At the same time, historical developments during this period enshrined an ambivalence, notably 
the introduction of a dichotomy focused around the depraved - deprived axis, evidenced by the 
increasing use of terms that referred to a discrete category of lawbreaker, namely young 
offenders  see for example. the Juvenile Offenders Act 1847 and  the Youthful Offenders Act 
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1854. Accordingly, the offenderising transition from child to offender was made at the point 
that children were determined to have fallen on the depraved side of that divide –In the absence 
of a clear youth justice process, this was largely a contingent process dependent on local 
arrangements (Case 2018).  
 
At the turn of the 20th century, the seminal Children Act 1908, and other related legislation, 
formalised the dichotomy – recognising the link between offending and social circumstances 
by having a single venue for crime and care – but also maintaining the divide by having 
different outcomes available. The Act established ‘Juvenile Courts’ with simultaneous 
jurisdiction over children ‘in trouble’ (requiring justice-based responses) and children ‘in need’ 
(requiring welfare-based care and protection). This systemic innovation thereby 
operationalised the rather messy (contingent) transitions that had characterised much of the 
previous century without resolving the tensions. This legislation constituted a fudge that aimed 
at the simultaneous punishment and rescue of the child. For children, it was as if their innocence 
required punishment for their own good. For current purposes, accordingly, the principal locus 
of bifurcation shifted from a dichotomous divide between children who could not offend by 
dint of their age and other lawbreakers, to a more blurred distinction between children who 
retained their innocence and those whose status within the justice system determined that they 
deserved punishment.   
 
The subsequent Children and Young Persons Act 1933 emphasised the potential innocence of 
all children by requiring courts to have regard to the welfare of the child whatever the reason 
for the court appearance. It is also raised the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 8 years, 
reducing the scope for a cohort of children to be treated as offenders. But these processes ran 
alongside an increased use of borstals and other (punitive) forms of institutionalisation, 
effectively widening the gap between those in need of care and protection and those who 
merited punishment and making the transition to offending status a more stark one for those 
who were deemed to fall the wrong side of that gap.  
 
The 1948 Act of the same name introduced professional social workers for all ‘troubled’ 
children, but once more this progressive step, that drew attention to the similarities between 
children who offended and those in need of protection, was undermined by the introduction of 
attendance centres for the former. One the one hand, institutional responsibilities promoted the 
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innocence of all children while simultaneously, the distinct mechanisms to which children were 
subject made loss of innocence for those children who broke the law more likely.  
 
The post-war period saw massive socio-economic changes, characterised especially bv the 
emergence of rampant consumerism, individualism and sharp rises in crime, which motivated 
an increased demonisation of children (Garland, 2001) and underpinned  a problematisation of 
delinquent youth subcultures. Youth justice policy, however, retained a resilience and 
optimism, associated with the rise of social science and the helping professions, ensuring that 
discourses based on the commonalities of children in need/trouble would continue to surface 
(Pitts, 2003).  For example, successive legislation in the 1960s recommended or introduced 
both raising the age of responsibility and enhancing the focus on care over control for children 
who offended. But even at the height of welfarism, a continued ambivalence towards children 
in trouble with the law was evident, reflected, for example, in the title the  1965 government 
white paper ‘The child, the family and the young offender’ (Home Office 1965, our emphasis). 
The document expressed largely welfarist sentiments but used terminology that betrayed the 
persistence of  an offenderising discourse, co-existing uncomfortably alongside care-focused 
recommendations.  
 
, In the event, the 1970s Conservative government retrenched on these welfarist ideals in favour 
of increased net-widening, systemic intervention and punitive responses, indicative of a ‘chill 
wind …blowing towards the young offender’ (Millham et al 1978: 33). While the rhetoric of 
welfare gained increased currency, in practice the suggestion that the criminal justice system 
could deliver treatment to children in need encouraged a considerable expansion in the number 
of children subject to criminal proceedings. 
 
In retrospect, the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 represented the highpoint of welfare-
oriented youth justice (Bateman, 2019). Key to its provisions, though not actually part of the 
statutory framework, was the introduction of intermediate treatment (IT), which encapsulated 
a variety of different forms of intervention designed to compensate for children’s impoverished 
backgrounds without the necessity for removing them from home (Home Office, 1968).  While 
IT could be offered to magistrates as a requirement of a supervision order, it was not restricted 
to those children subject to court orders.  As the Chief Inspector of the Children’s Department 




‘the facilities are to be available to adolescents who while living at home and continuing 
to attend school or wok, need, either by their own volition or by direction, new 
experiences in human relationships and in interesting activities’ (Cooper, 1970:23). 
 
This new form of intervention thus shared the ambivalence that had characterised earlier youth 
justice provision. But in the present  context, it had a particular significance since the conflation 
between welfare and justice promoted both net-widening and up-tariffing, over much of the 
next decade, as children who had already benefited from IT on a voluntary basis who continued 
to get in trouble were regarded as particularly suitable for punishment as they were not 
amenable to other forms of rehabilitation. The upshot was a dramatic rise in prosecutions, care 
orders as a disposal for often low-level offending, and custody (Thorpe et al, 1980). Ironically, 
therefore, even though the Act had attempted to offer a range of welfare type responses for 
adoption by the court in criminal cases, a continuum by which children could transition rapidly 
from being in need to being in need of punishment was clearly established.  
 
The trajectory of youth justice from its inception until the 1980s, therefore, was characterised 
by attempts to accommodate the recognition of the overlapping origins of children ‘in trouble’ 
and children ‘in need’, while reserving the right to punish children who were constructed as 
offender, and thereby lost their childhood status. The precise manner in which this played out 
varied at different times with a tariff more rapidly exposing children to harsher punishments 
for doing less.  Notably, the youth justice framework consistently allowed a transition from 
child to offender – at which point, punitive measures (sometimes justified on a welfare basis) 
and custodial options kicked in.  
 
2. Depenalising diversion and back to justice (1980-1992) 
As evidence of increased criminalisation that appeared to be a concomitant of IT type 
approaches became incontrovertible, there emerged a vociferous ‘back to justice’ movement 
which sought to disentangle responses to youth offending from other forms of need. The 
movement took shape during the latter part of the 1970s, but had a discernible, and remarkably 
rapid, influence from 1980 onwards (Haines and Drakeford, 1998). Broadly stated, this period 
constituted an evidence-based move away from punitive responses through an explicit 
commitment to minimum necessary intervention, diversion from the formal criminal justice 
system and a proliferation of alternatives to custody, on the grounds that youth offending is 
transitory and that formal contact with youth justice processes is iatrogenic. Although 
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motivated by a philosophy that identified itself as framed around justice precepts, the tendency 
to regard children in trouble as offenders rather than innocent was mitigated by the high levels 
of diversion from the system and extensive use of cautioning that reduced considerably the 
number of children subject to offenderisation.   
 
Proponents of justice, in their opposition to welfare were not endorsing punitive instincts but 
sought rather to address what they saw as the problems inherent in blurring the lines between 
offending and other forms of need. Most significantly perhaps, the justice lobby’s critique of 
welfarism charged it with a tendency to sentence children on the basis of their extensive social 
and economic needs rather than their (frequently) minor misdemeanours. Children were 
criminalised, it was argued, precisely because they needed support. But since social work 
intervention frequently did not lead to an immediate cessation of offending (cf. Martinson, 
1974), systematic dynamics favoured higher levels of punishment where children were seen as 
failing to benefit from support and therefore identified themselves as undeserving. At the same 
time, if evidence for social work intervention was limited, the iatrogenic impact of early or 
prolonged exposure to the formal YJS was glaringly evident (Rutherford, 1992).  
 
  
Practitioners and policy makers accordingly were increasingly committed to the principle of 
keeping children out of the system so far as possible through maximum diversion, minimum 
intervention and a stout opposition to the use of custody (Allen, 1991). Such measures were 
enforced through the deployment of systems management techniques for controlling the 
decisions made at each stage of the youth justice process (Tutt and Giller 1987), recognising 
that ‘it is the aggregated or cumulative effect of individual decision-making over time produces 
overall changes sensitive patterns’ (Bell and Haines 1991: 122). The statistical data are 
testimony to the success of the strategy which led to a rapid contraction in the number of 
children subject to formal criminal processing and a sharp fall (81%) in the use of imprisonment 
(cf. Home Office 1989, 1993; see also Haines and Drakeford 1998). Here we can thus discern 
what to many would appear to be a paradox – a commitment to justice combined with 
ostensibly progressive, rather than punitive outcomes, 
 
From the current perspective, however, what is significant is that the bifurcation between 
pathways for children destined for a welfare response became more firmly divorced from those 
for children consigned to the justice system. The transition from child to offender involved 
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meeting substantially higher thresholds than hitherto, but where thresholds were crossed the 
transition was clearer and more absolute. This dynamic operated at a number of levels. First, 
diversionary impulses clearly differentiated (the increasingly small number of) children whose 
behaviour warranted justice intervention from those who required support from other forms of 
service provision. The process was reinforced by the changing nature of interventions within 
the justice system increasingly oriented around offence focused work, or the correctional 
curriculum as it was widely referred to at the time (Denman, 1982), Second, the introduction 
of thresholds which had to be crossed before custody could be imposed distinguished those 
who merited deprivation of liberty from those who could be accommodated through alternative 
community sentencing. Third, while overall levels of child imprisonment declined there was a 
continued expansion in the imposition of long-term detention for children who committed what 
were deemed ‘grave crimes’ (Nacro 2003), thereby establishing a widening demarcation 
between those dealt with as ‘child offenders’ and those children liable to adult type penalties. 
Finally, developments within youth justice consolidated the bifurcation between children and 
adult offenders since diversionary impulses and restrictions on custody applied to children in 
particular. 
Antipathy to welfare was thus consistent with a punitive political rhetoric (Bateman, 2014) and 
minimum necessary intervention accordingly found considerable support from policy makers 
despite  the law and order pretensions of the Thatcher administration. In this context, the 
continued use of negative terminology to describe the smaller number of children in the youth 
justice system as ‘young offenders’ was unsurprising  (cf. Faulkner, under-secretary to the 
Home Office, addressing a 1987 meeting of the Magistrates’ Association). The first edition of 
National Standards for the supervision of offenders in the community, published in 1992, was 
notable for using the expressions ‘young offenders’ and ‘children and young people’ almost 
interchangeably (Home Office, 1992). 
 
Governmental support for the justice lobby was reflected in a succession of legislative 
developments, culminating in the separation of care and criminal proceedings by the Children 
Act 1989, which established a distinct family proceedings court to deal exclusively with 
welfare matters, thus undoing the blurring of welfare and justice inherent in the Children Act 
1908.  The increasingly small number of children prosecuted for offending were henceforth the 
sole clients of the juvenile court, itself renamed the youth court two years later. The divorce 
between welfare and justice was finally reflected in systemic separation which simultaneously 
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ensured that fewer children were subject to offenderisation but that those who did receive 
formal sanctions were more differentiated from their innocent counterparts.  
 
3. Fast-tracking the child to offender transition (1993-2007): The ‘punitive turn’ 
In contrast to the 1980s progressive movements of ‘back to justice’ and diversion, from the 
early 1990s, a globalised risk perspective began to dominate the ways in which key youth 
justice stakeholders constructed  offending by children.  Essentially, children’s offending was 
to be understood as the predetermined outcome of exposure to psychosocial ‘risk factors’ – 
criminogenic influences that increased the likelihood of future offending. This new 
construction required a corresponding shift in youth justice practice whose focus would 
become the identification of risk at an early stage and the delivery of compulsory intervention 
to address it(see Case and Haines 2009).The predominance of risk perspectives thus catalysed 
a punitive turn in Anglophone youth justice - an era of exponential punitiveness and penality 
that was characterised by: 
 
‘a decline in rehabilitative ideals, harsher prison conditions, more emotional and 
expressive forms of punishment emphasising shaming and degradation’ (Snacken and 
Dumortier 2012: 2-3).  
 
Socio-economic changes influenced by globalisation motivated populist political agendas 
targeted at increasing the public’s feelings of control over their environments (Snacken and 
Dumortier 2012). The ‘risk thinking’ (Gray 2009) which this engendered served to exacerbate 
public fears of the (allegedly) growing problem of youth offending, while simultaneously 
encouraging increasingly harsh youth justice responses as a means of alleviating that very 
public anxiety (cf. McAra 2017), betraying an insidious ‘culture of control’ over children’s 
behaviour (Garland 2001).  Frequently described as a ‘punitive turn’ (Muncie 2008), these 
dynamics heralded a sharp and unpredictable change in the trajectory of youth justice, 
exemplified by ‘vertical expansion’ in the form of burgeoning prison populations and 
‘horizontal expansion’ through the proliferation of regulatory, control and surveillance. The 
development of a tougher justice model inevitably trumped welfare leading to the ‘downsizing 
of the welfare sector [and] upsizing of the penal sector’ (Wacquant 2009: 167). Muncie (2008) 




• Repenalisation – increased punishment-focused justice responses that were retributive, 
informed by deterrence, underpinned by custody and reflected in the increasing use of the 
‘young offender’ label; 
• Neo-liberalism – a reduced emphasis on social contexts, state protection and 
rehabilitation and more on prescriptions of individual responsibility (see also Dunkel 2014) 
and governing at a distance; 
• Responsibilisation – allocating the primary responsibility for the prevention of youth 
offending to children, families and communities’ 
• Adulterisation – the increasing treatment of children who offend as though they are 
adults in terms of maturity, capability and responsibility, reflected in punitive youth justice 
responses to offending. 
In England and Wales, the ‘punitive turn’ was illustrated in revised guidance to the police, 
which encouraged the increased use of prosecution (Bateman 2003) and a raft of legislative 
changes aimed at targeting ‘young offenders’. Statutory measures lowered the age at which 
children could be imprisoned in the youth court and increased the maximum custodial sentence 
available in that venue from six to 24 months for a single offence (Nacro, 2003). From 1992 to 
2001, the number of custodial sentences imposed on children rose by 90% (Nacro 2003). A 
climate of ‘institutionalized intolerance’ and ‘the politicization of juvenile crime’ (cf. Muncie 
2014) prevailed, with political and media rhetoric in relation to children in trouble increasingly 
conflated the developmental categories of childhood, adolescence/youth and adulthood. It was 
as if children who offended had been ‘removed from the category of “child” altogether’ (Jenks 
1996: 128). The rhetoric of New Labour Home Secretary, Jack Straw, epitomised the 
underlying philosophy as one that would allow ‘No More Excuses’ (Home Office, 1997). The 
barriers that had successfully kept children down-tariff previously were breached as the full 
range of disposals increasingly became available for all children over the age of criminal 
responsibility and incarceration was no longer restricted to a small minority.  
 
From the standpoint that underpins this article, the ‘new punitiveness’ (Goldson, 2002), shifted 
the mechanisms by which children were converted from vulnerable innocents to risky offenders 
in important ways. In contrast to the previous period, which had relied on a clear boundary 
between welfare and justice cases to delineate those who were entitled to care and those deemed 
to merit punishment, the punitive turn operated to break down such barriers to a considerable 
extent, making the transition a much more fluid one. Any continued insistence that the system 
could be described as a series of bifurcations was ‘misleading and ideological, since it 
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capture[d] inaccurately the relations between the available penal responses’ (Matthews 2003: 
227).  
 
Rather the increasingly actuarial stance towards children (McAra, 2010), which conceptualised 
them all as potentially risky, required that a substantial cohort of children were viewed as 
offenders in the making. Children who offended were understood in terms of a deficit model 
which constructed their behaviour as the product of individualised flaws and weaknesses that 
posed risks to themselves and others and justified harsher and more adult-oriented punishment 
(Case and Haines 2009). Children who shared those individual deficits, even if they had yet to 
offend, were regarded as legitimate targets for similar forms of intervention as a means of youth 
crime prevention that in effect eroded the boundaries between youth measures and work with 
children who were not formally ‘offenders’ but whose behaviour was deemed problematic. 
Increasingly, youth work, training and careers provision and social work with older children 
was functionally annexed by the YJS; an instance of what John Simon (2007) has called 
‘governing through crime.’ As the barriers dissolved, so the pathway along which children 
made the transition from innocent to demon became smoother, more easily followed, and more 
speedily travelled.  
 
The process gathered pace with the provisions of New Labour’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 
which sought to realign previous constructions of youth crime through the introduction of a 
statutory aim for the system of preventing offending, thereby conflating adjudicated childhood 
offending and potential lawbreaking. The Act legislated to invent the notion of ‘pre-offending’: 
behaviour that fell short of criminality but was nonetheless to attract a court sanction, albeit 
formally outside of the YJS, through the notorious anti-social behaviour order (ASBO), breach 
of which did constitute an offence and could lead to imprisonment (Solanki, et al, 2006).  
 
Child safety orders were made available for children who behaved in ways which would have 
been criminal but for the, not insignificant, fact that they were below the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility (Walsh, 2009). Moreover, the abolition of doli incapax for children aged 
10-13, the rebuttable legal presumption that children in this age range were not criminally 
liable, constituted a lowering – for practical purposes - of the age of criminal responsibility. 
Children who previously would have avoided criminalisation because the prosecution was not 
able to prove that they knew what they were doing was seriously wrong were henceforth subject 
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to the full rigours of the law and denied the innocent status they would otherwise have enjoyed 
(Fionda, 2000). 
 
The reduced scope for diversion, which been increasingly restricted by the previous 
Conservative administration, was cemented with the replacement of police cautions for 
children with a system of reprimands and final warnings which ensured that they would be 
prosecuted, at latest, on the third occasion that they came to police attention (Bateman, 2003). 
The reaches of the YJS were accordingly expanded into places that would hitherto been the 
remit of welfare services while formal criminalisation and prosecution became increasingly 
likely (Muncie, 1999). 
 
Whereas the governance of children had traditionally recognised two distinct spheres – albeit 
related in different configurations at different times - that distinction became increasingly hard 
to recognise  as youth justice, or crime prevention, interventions trumped other forms of work 
with young people. This was particularly evident where the deficit model associated with the 
risk paradigm extended from the individual child to the family. Parenting orders – which 
required the subjects to attend parenting programmes – were introduced for parents of children 
who offend, for those engaging in anti-social behaviour and for those not attending school on 
a regular basis (Nacro, 2004). The traditional transition from child to offender across distinct 
boundaries, was thus replaced by a continuum with relatively fluid thresholds along which a 
substantial cohort of children (primarily those of disadvantaged origins) were located as 
potential or actual offenders. The differentiation between these two categories was 
considerably less marked than hitherto. In that context, the impact of the ‘punitive turn’ on 
children was characterised by increased offenderisation, consolidated by the implementation 
of strategies encouraging the loss of childhood status for those whose background 
circumstances were assessed as placing them at risk of breaking the law as well as those who 
actually did so.  
4. Tentative depenalisation: Interventionist diversion and risk assessment lite (2008-
present) 
 
If the Crime and Disorder 1998 reforms effectively represented a distillation of pre-existing 
punitive trends rather than innovation (Fionda 2005), a genuine turning point in the trajectory 
of youth justice can be discerned in the period from 2008. Albeit that the shift has been 
characterised as a pragmatic response to burgeoning caseloads and socio-economic change in 
15 
 
the form of sweeping austerity (Bateman 2014), the introduction of a target to reduce the 
number of children entering the YJS for the first time (so called first time entrants (FTEs)) 
triggered a rapid rise in decriminalisation, diversion and a dramatic fall in the population of the 
secure estate for children (Bateman 2012). The contraction of the system has continued apace 
to the present (Bateman 2017). The FTE target was supported by changes in the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012, which rendered the foregoing 
escalatory out-of-court system obsolete and replaced it with a less punitive and more flexible 
and diversionary process of youth cautioning (Hart, 2012). The introduction of a range of non-
statutory measures, most importantly community resolutions, allowed informal disposal of 
children’s offending, without a criminal record. Indeed, on the basis of system contraction, 
youth justice under the post-Labour governments has been presented as a (non-punitive) 
success story, particularly in statistical terms. According to data published by the Youth Justice 
Board, ‘proven offences’ by children declined by 75% between March 2008-March 2016 (MoJ/ 
YJB, 2019), although it should be noted that reoffending levels have continued to rise and the 
reduction in custody has more recently stalled (MOJ/YJB 2019).  
 
The implications of these positive trends for the transition that is the focus of this article are, 
as yet, a little hard to discern. Without doubt, these trends have been associated with a renewed 
interest in a discourse orientated on welfare concerns and the associated political and 
professional reconstruction of children in trouble as children in need.  A government-
commissioned review of youth justice, by Charlie Taylor, argued for a YJS that focuses on 
‘children first, offenders second’, noting that since many of the causes of youth crime lie 
beyond the reach of  youth justice agencies, a broad range of  services should provide an 
integrated response to preventing and addressing offending behaviour (Taylor, 2016 Taylor 
argued further for the replacement of young offender institutions and secure training centres 
by secure schools which would place education at the heart of detention (Taylor, 2016) and the 
government has accepted this proposal in principle (Ministry of Justice, 2016).  
 
Significantly, the Youth Justice Board has recently committed itself to pursuing a ‘child first’ 
philosophy (Youth Justice Board 2008; see also Haines and Case 2015). The latest edition of 
youth justice standards, published in 2019, reflect this shift through a distinct change in 
terminology. There are no references to ‘young offenders’ who become ‘children in the youth 
justice system’; albeit children who remain ‘offenders second’ at points in the document 




On the other hand, little concrete progress has, to date, been made towards these progressive 
objectives and, indeed, the government response to them has been partly selective, partly 
neglect, representing something of ‘a missed opportunity’ (Bateman, 2017: 3). At the time of 
writing, just one pilot secure school has been announced, on the site of Medway secure training 
centre (Article 39, 2019); there appears to be no political, legislative or economic appetite to 
affect changes to the existing justice system as proposed by Taylor at this juncture. Where 
children enter the formal YJS, they continue to be subject to interventions whose underlying 
rationale is punishment and whose focus is the child’s offending. Moreover, it is clear that, in 
some areas at least, decisions about the point at which children transition to offender status 
continue to be informed by assessments of the risk of reoffending rather than considerations of 
long-term healthy development and well-being (Hampson, 2018). Considerable numbers of 
children diverted from the formal reaches of the justice system continue to be subject to 
interventions which resemble closely those that they would have experienced had they received 
a formal sanction (Kelly and Armitage, 2015). While some youth offending teams appear to 
have embraced a child-first ethos, others remain wedded to offender management and punitive 
justice (Smith and Gray, 2018). Moreover, the Youth Justice Board itself is not wholly 
consistent in adopting a child first vision: it endorses, for example, trauma informed practice 
on the grounds that it will reduce offending and reoffending; and has ‘reducing serious youth 
violence’ as one of its strategic priorities (Youth Justice Board, 2019).   
 
Diversion has clearly increased but the underlying ethos of minimum intervention which 
informed high levels of diversion in the 1980s is not necessarily at play. A renewed recognition 
that offending behaviour may be a symptom of welfare need has accompanied the contraction 
of the formal YJS, but forms of intervention continue to reflect risk thinking, addressing 
individual deficits and emphasising the child’s accountability for their actions. In some senses, 
this is unsurprising since austerity offers little scope for the allocation of increased resources 
to address children’s vulnerabilities (Bateman, 2014).   
 
The rhetoric of child first has, in other words, yet to be fully realised in practice. As a 
consequence, the transition from child to offender might be viewed as something of a hybrid 
of that which pertained in earlier periods. As in the 1980s, travelling down the path from 
innocent child to becoming an adjudicated offender and receiving a formal criminal justice 
sanction involves meeting a significantly higher threshold than in the period immediately prior 
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to 2008. On the other hand, as during the 1970s, the reach of the YJS is clearly evident in work 
with children who are not subject to formal youth justice sanctions as the role of youth 
offending teams has shifted to a focus on preventive work (Deloitte, 2015). The blurring of 
welfare and justice populations that characterised the New Labour reforms continues to 
exercise a powerful influence. The brakes may have been applied, but the continuum that leads 
from child to offender continues to exist. Far fewer children receive formal sanctions and there 
has therefore been a substantial reduction in offenderisation as we define it; at the same time, 
the behaviour of children who are diverted out of the YJS continues to be addressed through 
an offending lens with a corresponding potential for stigmatisation to occur in the absence of 
formal sanction. Here, we do not have space to pursue this issue in detail, but it is worth noting 
too that, as previously argued, for some groups of children the transition to ‘offender’ occurs 
more readily and with greater frequency. The increased barriers to criminalisation have a 
reduced traction with these groups. As David Lammy (2017) pointed out in his review of the 
treatment of black and minority ethnic (BAME) individuals in the criminal justice system, the 
proportion of first-time entrants into the YJS from a BAME background rose from 11% in 2006 
to 19% in 2016; similarly BAME overrepresentation in the children’s custodial estate increased 
from 25% to 41% of the detained child population between 2006 and 2016. By January 2019, 
minority ethnic children accounted for more than half of those in the secure estate (Youth 
Custody Service, 2019). There have been similar, albeit less pronounced, rises in the proportion 
of looked-after children in the secure estate (Bateman et al, 2018). The offenderisation of these 
populations relative to their peers has accordingly increased providing powerful evidence of 
the continued potential of offenderisation to impact adversely children’s life chances.  
 
Offenderising the child over time  
The foregoing historical analysis demonstrates two features of youth justice in England and 
Wales. First, from its inception the YJS has consistently been marked by a process of 
offenderisation whereby children in trouble are accorded a different, and stigmatising, status 
to their peers. Second, that process takes different forms at different times. Until the 1980s, it 
is possible to trace the trajectory of youth justice as being concerned to reconcile the competing 
tensions of welfare and justice, which was achieved primarily through increasingly large 
numbers of children becoming adjudicated offenders.  
 Subsequently, through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, punitive political rhetoric masked 
practice movements more inclined towards diversion for children in trouble, resulting in a 
period in which smaller numbers of children were offenderised, but the differentiation between 
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those who attained criminal status and those who did not became sharper., The ‘punitive turn’ 
of the 1990s radically reversed this trajectory , substantially expanding the offenderisation of 
children by fast-tracking them through the YJS and popularising ‘youth offender’ terminology, 
whilst simultaneously exposing the child (once assigned offender status and a criminal record) 
to increased levels of control, monitoring and surveillance. More recent developments can be 
seen as representing a further change of direction although continuing to draw on dynamics 
evident in earlier period and manifesting contradictions that have yet to be resolved. A renewed 
focus on diversion, and an reinvigorated attention to the needs of the child, has moderated 
offenderisation, but the route along which the transition from child to offender is made remains 
clearly visible.  
 
 If historical analysis demonstrates a periodised trajectory of offenderisation in the 
development of youth justice in England and Wales, it is also important to consider the 
possibility of a mirrored transition, from offender back to child. To what extent does 
offenderisation operate in reverse?  In our view, across the historical period analysed, the 
escalator appears largely to have gone in one direction. The transition from young offender to 
child is significantly less common for a number of reasons.  
 
Perhaps most obviously, the window of opportunity for re-attaining childhood status is a small 
one. The majority of those subject to a formal youth justice sanction are already in their mid-
teens and rapidly approaching the age of majority. Given that that childhood entitlements in 
other spheres become increasingly rationed as children progress beyond their 16th birthday – 
local authorities are for instance, loathe to take children into care past that age – reverting back 
to child status for those who have been denied it by virtue of their offending, in the short time 
available before they turn 18 years, is inherently challenging. Such challenges are exacerbated 
by the impact of offenderisation itself, which tends to undermine the potential for rehabilitation 
and increases the prospects of reoffending McVie and McAra, 2011), thereby reaffirming the 
ascription of offender status. Finally, the criminal record attached to offender status acts as a 
signifier that the protections of childhood have been removed and forms a barrier to entry to 
education and other services to which non-offending children are entitled.  
This is not to suggest that reverse transitions cannot occur. Children subject to formal out of 
court disposals, for instance, have significantly lower rates of proven reoffending (Ministry of 
Justice / Youth Justice Board (2018) and are not routinely required to declare their criminal 
history (Standing Committee for Youth Justice, 2016). As a consequence, the possibility that 
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the ascription of offender status will be temporary is enhanced. Lower level court sentences – 
such as the referral order – also have better recidivism rates and shorter rehabilitation periods 
and tend to focus more on reintegration of the child, although the extent to which rehabilitative 
intent is delivered in practice is open to question (Newbury, 2011).  Other recent developments 
show that offenderisation is not inevitable when children break the law. The reconstruction of 
what had been understood in terms of child prostitution as child sexual exploitation, for 
instance has effectively removed a large cohort of girls from the criminal justice system 
(Lovett, Coy and Kelly, 2018). The emergence of the concept of child criminal exploitation 
which can provide a diversionary rationale for some children caught up in ‘county lines’ also 
provides a mechanism that opens the possibility for a child to be diverted from the transition 
to offender status where they have come to attention for lawbreaking activities (Stone, 2018). 
But these particular examples might be seen as exceptions that ‘prove the rule’: children 
involved in country lines who are not among the small minority who meet the high threshold 




We contend that such mirrored or reverted transitions are far less evident across the history of 
youth justice in England and Wales, due in large part to the structural, systemic and personal 
barriers associated with offenderisation.  For example, many children assigned offender status 
and subjected to a custodial disposal present with multiple and complex (criminogenic) needs 
and vulnerabilities, including a history of victimisation and disempowerment that may serve as 
barriers to making positive choices and reversing the offenderisation process (see Hazel et al 
2017). Offenderised children are also disproportionately likely to have experienced traumatic 
events, social injustice and social exclusion.  This toxic collection of vulnerabilities, traumas 
and exclusions can foster entrenched patterns of offending (as a normalised behaviour for the 
child), rendering reform and rehabilitation (Bateman and Hazel 2014).  When these negative 
experiences are considered alongside the labelling and stigmatising influence of the imposition 
of a criminal record and the persistent use of derogatory ‘youth offender’ terminology, it 
becomes clear that offenderisation can construct, illuminate and exacerbate multiple barriers 






Conclusion: There must be 50 ways to erode innocence  
Critical exploration of the historical trajectory of youth justice from the creation of the juvenile 
court in 1908 to the present day illuminates two dimensions of that system: first there is a 
persistent underlying offenderisation dynamic that reconstructs children who come to the 
attention of the YJS as offenders who can no longer be considered innocent; but second, that 
offenderisation dynamic takes different forms as the system evolves in response to the political, 
cultural and practice environment.  
 
The initial social constructions of bespoke youth justice responses to children who offend, until 
the 1970s, attempted to address the shared influences on children ‘in need’ and ‘children in 
trouble’. Consequently, policy and practice oscillated between welfare and justice priorities, 
with justice at its extreme polarity, animated via punitiveness. The arguably over-simplified, 
yet inherently pragmatic welfare-justice dichotomy has been manifest in academic and political 
perceptions of (similarly over-simplified) bifurcated approaches that have differentiated 
children from adult offenders. A particular animation of this bifurcation was evident in the 
1980s, with more transient, trivial offenders (considered in need and receiving diversionary 
and minimum necessary intervention responses) distinguished from more serious, persistent 
offenders (considered problematic and necessitating punitive responses).  
 
The 1990s punitive turn saw an insidious blurring, even rejection, of the child ‘in need’ – child 
‘in trouble’ dichotomy that had historically underpinned bifurcated welfare-justice responses 
to offending behaviour. That dichotomy was rapidly superseded by smoother mechanisms of 
transition that relied on a continuum rather than bifurcation. This pathway was one where need 
was increasingly trumped by attributions of risk and a focus on the potential of disadvantaged 
children to cause harm. 
 
At the time of writing (January 2020), the temporary and uncertain political context of youth 
justice reflects the conflict and ambivalence that has characterised much of its development 
through the ages. The numbers of children both offending and entering the YJS for the first 
time have been falling annually for over a decade now, indicative of more child-focused, 
diversionary responses to low-level offending.  
 
But this is not simply a question of history repeating itself however or an instance of what 
Bernard and Kurlychek (2010) call the cycle of juvenile justice (see also Goldson 2015). Up to 
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the late 1970s, welfarism tended to be associated with net-widening. High rates of diversion, 
evident in the 1980s, were conversely associated with a rejection of welfare principles in favour 
of justice tenets. The latter period, in contrast with its predecessor, relied heavily on forms of 
bifurcation which were effectively eroded by the punitive excesses of the 1990s and have not 
resurfaced even though those excesses have been moderated.  
 
The current conjuncture accordingly represents an unprecedented configuration characterised 
by: relatively low level of prosecution and custody; a foregrounding of the similarities between 
children in need and children in trouble; and the retention of a risk-focused orientation to both 
populations. The latter in particular ensures that the potential for loss of innocence remains a 
dominant feature of the system, as children are arrayed along a continuum of lesser or greater 
risk of offending, that can readily lead to them being constructed as offenders or as requiring 
crime prevention interventions. As noted previously, particular groups of children are 
especially vulnerable to such constructions.  
 
The decriminalisation of considerable numbers of children over the past twelve or so years is, 
of course, to be applauded. Its driving impulse has, however, to a considerable degree been 
instrumental rather than informed by a principled rejection of punishing as a mechanism for 
managing the behaviour of the most disadvantaged children (Bateman, 2014). The dynamic by 
which children forfeit their innocence as they make the transition to offender remains firmly in 
place. In this context, the emergence of more punitive sentiments might easily lead to that 
transition being experienced more rapidly and at an earlier stage. Any complacency as to the 
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